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INTRODUCTION
Imagine a vast piece of beautiful country land. A house sits quietly at
the back edge of the lot with a white picket fence surrounding it. A family
comprised of a mother, a father, a young son, and a toddler daughter lives
happily, enjoying each other’s company while the children run, laughing
across the acres. For several weeks out of each year, though, the family is
forced to lock themselves indoors with all windows shut tight. The
property adjacent to theirs is filled with sugarcane stalks, and farmers are
burning the crop in preparation for harvest. This burning produces ash and
thick, dark smoke that rolls onto the family’s land, causing breathing
problems for both children. Additionally, the ash settles onto the property,
creating unsuitable conditions for the children to play outdoors. Their
world is made of sugar and smoke.1
Sugarcane farmers contend that burning the stalks is necessary for
their crop.2 Sugarcane is a staple crop in Louisiana, and it is the top plant
commodity in the state.3 Louisiana has been producing sugarcane since
1751 and commercially since 1795.4 Of Louisiana’s sixty-four parishes,
twenty-five parishes produce sugarcane, covering a total of 450,000
acres.5 According to the Louisiana Department of Agriculture and Forestry
and the Louisiana State University Agricultural Center, “[i]n 1999, total
1. German psychiatrist and novelist Alfred Doblin originally said, “The
world is made of sugar and dirt.”
2. See Anthony Pignataro, Complaints About Sugar Cane Burns Are Flooding
the County of Maui and EPA. But Will Anything Change?, MAUITIME (Sept. 27,
2012), http://mauitime.com/culture/complaints-sugar-cane-burns-flooding-countymaui-epa-change/#disqus_thread [https://perma.cc/NEJ6-3X4G].
3. LA. DEP’T OF AGRIC. & FORESTRY & LSU AGCENTER, LOUISIANA
SUGARCANE BURNING (n.d), http://www.lsuagcenter.com/NR/rdonlyres/C3F0AE
0A-FC91-48EA-BC50-53B3CD22214B/3294/pub2820sugarburn2.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/PXN8-LGAR] [hereinafter LOUISIANA SUGARCANE BURNING].
4. Id.
5. Id.
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production of 15,982,000 tons of sugarcane yielded 1,675,000 tons of
sugar. Growers averaged thirty-seven tons of sugarcane and 7,800 pounds
of sugar per acre, both new state records.”6 Based on those numbers, the
direct economic value from sugarcane exceeded $2 billion.7 Louisiana
produces sixteen percent of the sugar produced in the United States, and
the industry employs 32,000 people in the state.8
Landowners believe that they should be free from intrusion and that
they should have the right to use and enjoy their property exclusively.9
This belief is not unreasonable, but as residents move into areas once
occupied primarily by industries, laws change to satisfy the claims being
brought by disgruntled property owners.10 Residents have raised concerns
about health issues, property value diminution, and interference with use
of land stemming from the burning of neighboring sugarcane fields.11
The state of Louisiana too loosely regulates the burning of sugarcane.
Because of the way the laws are written and the requirements necessary to
recover from damage, residents are limited in the claims they can bring
against farmers. This Article argues that the Louisiana Smoke
Management Guidelines for Sugarcane Harvesting12 should be a
mandatory program for all sugarcane farmers to follow. Additionally,
trespass laws should be modified to include claims from residents affected
by the burning of sugarcane fields. Trespass by intangible materials, such
as ash and smoke from sugarcane burning, should be an accepted claim in
Louisiana tort law. The intent element of trespass, a common theme
throughout this Article, requires reformation as well. Typically, it is the
intention, or lack thereof, to actually enter the land of another that is
analyzed in a trespass claim. What should be examined, though, is whether
there is intent to commit an initial act that the actor should have reason to
know will result in an intrusion on another’s property.

Id.
Id.
LOUISIANA SUGARCANE BURNING, supra note 3.
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., W. PROSSER AND W. KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS 29 (5th ed. 1984); Borland v. Sanders Lead Co., 369 So. 2d 523, 527 (Ala.
1979); See DANIEL P. SELMI & KENNETH A. MANASTER, STATE ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW 2-1, 2-2 to 2-3 (8th ed. 1997).
10. For instance, the Right to Farm Act was developed to give immunity to
sugarcane farmers if nearby residents suffered damage from smoke and ash
residue. LA. REV. STAT. § 3:17(E) (2016).
11. See, e.g., Pignataro, supra note 2.
12. LA. DEP’T OF AGRIC. & FORESTRY & LSU AGCENTER, LOUISIANA
SMOKE MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES FOR SUGARCANE HARVESTING (2000).
6.
7.
8.
9.
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Part I briefly discusses the importance of sugarcane and crop burning,
along with weighing the advantages and disadvantages of the burning
practice, as seen by both residents and farmers. It also compares
Louisiana’s sugarcane burning regulations to burning regulations in other
prominent sugarcane states. Part II of this Article explains the theories of
nuisance, negligence, common law trespass, and the modern view of
trespass. Further, it discusses the bundle of rights that each theory protects.
Part III discusses various cases in which courts have disagreed about when
the modern view of trespass is appropriate for an intangible material claim.
Finally, Part IV proposes a solution for the regulation of sugarcane burning
in order to reduce the amount of ash and smoke transmitted onto
residential properties. Additionally, it proposes a suitable way to reform
the law of trespass so that no family is ever left locked inside their home
with no adequate legal remedy available.
I. SUGARCANE BURNING AS A NECESSARY EVIL
While residents see the benefits of growing sugarcane in the state, they
also suffer harm from the practices that farmers use to harvest the crop.13
Farmers, though, contend that burning sugarcane is necessary to ensure
the best and most efficient harvesting seasons.14
A. Importance of the Burning Practice
Crop burning is an essential process for the sugarcane industry.15
Sugarcane farmers are able to get juice from approximately seventy-five
to eighty percent of the plant.16 This juice is then turned into crystallized
sugar.17 The leafy portions of the plant, called trash, do not produce
enough sugar to salvage and are removed by burning the fields.18 Burning
gets rid of the green, leafy portions of the plant so that the bulk of the crop
13. Andy Reid, Beginning of Sugar Cane Harvest Reignites Field Burning
Debate, SOUTH FLA. SUN SENTINEL (Sept. 30, 2015, 5:44 PM), http://www.sunsentinel.com/local/palm-beach/fl-cane-burning-resumes-20150930-story.html
[https://perma.cc/5X6X-GMJT].
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Ken Stickney, Sugar Cane League: Few Complaints About Burns, DAILY
ADVERTISER (Nov. 29, 2014, 5:25 PM), http://www.theadvertiser.com/story/
news/local/2014/11/29/sugar-cane-league-complaints-burns/19670793/ [https://
perma.cc/Y98A-FG8S].
17. Id.
18. Id.
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can be brought to mills for processing and packaging.19 Additionally, if
the trash was left on the fields, decomposition of the leaves could cause
the soil to dry out, leading to a substantial decrease in the following year’s
crop production.20 Alternatives, such as bringing the entire plant to mills
for sorting and processing, are far more costly and disadvantageous to both
farmers and overall state economies.21 Estimates have shown that more
than $24 million in extra funds would be needed for transportation and
processing costs if burning was not part of the harvesting process.22
Burning the fields also shortens the harvest season by up to ten percent,
while simultaneously increasing the amount of sugar produced.23
B. Residents’ Complaints and the Harm from Burning Practices
The burning process in crop fields produces ash and smoke, which
often naturally drifts in the wind, landing and settling onto neighboring
properties.24 Residents in states such as Louisiana, Florida, and Hawaii
have raised numerous complaints about the particulate matter resulting
from sugarcane burns reaching their property.25 Such complaints range
from devaluation of property to health issues.26
Residents in Maui, Hawaii, addressed their concerns after a recent
burn season, complaining that they were forced to keep doors and
windows of their homes shut because the smoke and ash drift were heavy
enough to cause breathing difficulties.27 To make matters worse, many of
these individuals lack air conditioning in their homes. Open windows are
their only source of ventilation, which is then negatively affected by
smoke blowing in from neighboring burning fields.28 Other residents
alleged that the smoke visibly obscured parts of the town for hours on
end.29
Similar complaints exist among Louisiana residents. Due to sugarcane
burning, residents are experiencing breathing problems, allergies, and ash-

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
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Stickney, supra note 16.
LOUISIANA SUGARCANE BURNING, supra note 3.
Id.
See Reid, supra note 13.
See, e.g., id.
See Pignataro, supra note 2; Reid, supra note 13.
Pignataro, supra note 2.
Id.
Id.
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covered properties.30 Yet, litigation is scarce because of the immunity
given to sugarcane farmers under the Right to Farm Act.31
C. Lack of Regulation of Sugarcane Burning in Louisiana
Louisiana has taken steps to protect the safety and property rights of
residents living around sugarcane fields. One of these steps includes
prescribed burns. Prescribed burns are “controlled application of fire in a
confined predetermined area to accomplish the harvest of sugarcane under
specified smoke and ash management guidelines.”32 According to one
Louisiana statute, prescribed burns must:
(1) Be conducted only under written authority according to the
requirements of the commissioner;
(2) Be conducted only when at least one certified prescribed burn
manager is present on site from ignition until the burn is
completed and declared safe according to prescribed guidelines;
and
(3) Be considered a property right of the property owner if
naturally occurring vegetative fuels are used.33
The requirement of having a certified prescribed burn manager34 helps to
ensure there is an informed participant throughout the entirety of the
burning process. The LSU AgCenter gives farmers the opportunity to
complete an approved training program and written test in order to become
certified.35 While Louisiana law requires certified prescribed burn
managers to be on site while a burn is taking place, the burn managers are
not required to abide by the Louisiana Smoke Management Guidelines for
30. See Stickney, supra note 16.
31. The Right to Farm Act protects sugarcane farmers with a rebuttable
presumption of non-negligence. LA. REV. STAT. § 3:17(E) (2019).
32. LOUISIANA SUGARCANE BURNING, supra note 3.
33. LA. REV. STAT. § 3:17(D) (2019).
34. A “certified prescribed burn manager” under Louisiana Revised Statutes
§ 3:17(C)(1) is an individual who successfully completes the certification
program of the Louisiana State University Agricultural Center or other approved
program and is certified by the Louisiana Department of Agriculture and Forestry.
LA. REV. STAT. § 3:17(C)(1) (2019).
35. William A. Carney, Jr. & Benjamin L. Legendre, Certified Prescribed Burn
Manager Program for Sugarcane, LSU AGCENTER (June 28, 2005, 11:21 PM),
http://www.lsuagcenter.com/topics/crops/sugarcane/prescribed_burning/certifiedprescribed-burn-manager-program-for-agriculture-sugarcane [https://perma.cc/U4
GW-LGVF].
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Sugarcane Harvesting.36 If followed, though, the Guidelines would assist
farmers in adhering to a procedure to reduce smoke and ash drift onto
neighboring properties.37
Under the Louisiana Right to Farm Act, the State protects sugarcane
farmers from liability, unless claimants can prove negligence on the part
of the burners,38 presenting an issue concerning rights of residents near
sugarcane burns that needs to be addressed. With this Act, the State is
protecting farmers, even though farmers are not required to follow
guidelines to protect residents in return. Many other states, however, have
stringent guidelines for smoke management that are mandatory for
sugarcane farmers to follow.39 Each sugarcane state’s individual smoke
and ash mitigation program, including Louisiana’s voluntary guidelines,
is in compliance with the USDA Agricultural Air Quality Task Force
(AAQTF), a Congressionally mandated group that controls air quality
among agricultural communities.40
For instance, Hawaii’s Department of Health recommends that
sugarcane farmers post public notice prior to burning the fields to alert
residents that potential side effects of the practice may soon be coming or
may already be present.41 When the same situation arose in Louisiana, the
idea was rejected, not once, but twice.42 In Racca v. St. Mary Sugar
Cooperative, Inc., a Louisiana plaintiff contended that a defendant
sugarcane company had a duty to have the Department of Transportation
and Development (DOTD) put up warning signs on the side of roads to
alert drivers that certain areas may be muddy from trucks hauling
sugarcane debris and that driving conditions may be affected.43 The
Louisiana First Circuit rejected this idea, stating that although a Louisiana
statute allows DOTD to install these signs,44 there is no mandatory duty
36. LA. DEP’T OF AGRIC. & FORESTRY & LSU AGCENTER, supra note 12.
37. Id.
38. LA. REV. STAT. § 3:17(E) (2019).
39. See discussion infra Sections I.C.1, I.C.2, and I.C.3.
40. Sara Fletcher, An Assessment of Technology Adoptability in Sugarcane
Burning Smoke Plume Mitigation (Jan. 1, 2013) (unpublished Master thesis,
University of South Carolina) (on file with University Libraries, University of
South Carolina) (see specifically page 21).
41. Id.
42. Racca v. St. Mary Sugar Coop., Inc., 872 So. 2d 1117, 1123 (La. Ct. App.
1st Cir. 2004) (citing Bijeaux v. State Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., 702 So. 2d, 1088,
1092 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1997)).
43. Racca, 872 So. 2d at 1123.
44. LA. REV. STAT. § 48:346.1 (2016) (stating that during sugarcane harvest
season, the DOTD may place temporary road signs to warn motorists of road
hazards in those parishes where sugarcane is harvested).
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for the DOTD to do so.45 Additionally, the Racca court stated that erection
of these warning signs would result in an excess of signs along Louisiana
highways during sugarcane season.46
There is no clear justification for the disparity between the
encouragement of putting up road signs or passing out flyers in Hawaii yet
discouraging the practice in Louisiana. If farmers were encouraged to give
public notice of their burns, residents could more adequately prepare their
own properties by doing things such as securing additional means of air
ventilation when they know their doors and windows will need to be
closed.
1. Hawaii
Hawaii has, perhaps, the most rigorous set of smoke and ash
management guidelines of all four sugarcane states. Hawaii’s Department
of Health mandates a smoke management program for all sugarcane
farmers in the state.47 The Department of Health also requires each farmer
to have a permit in order to burn fields.48 To apply for a permit, the farmer
must provide the Department of Health with their burn schedule, the scale
of the burn, a map of the field to be burned, and expected weather
conditions, such as wind direction and speed.49 Additionally, farmers pay
a fee based on the number of acres to be burned in order to secure their
burn permits.50 Certain areas are considered highly sensitive and cannot be
burned when conditions are less than perfect; such areas include those near
major highways, airports, and adjacent to residences and other public
areas.51 When burning is allowed in these areas, farmers are encouraged to
send out notices to residents and businesses, warning that burns are soon
to occur.52 These notices often take the form of flyers or even road signs.53
Failure to comply with the mandatory mitigation guidelines set forth by
the Department of Health results in citations for the field.54

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
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2. Florida
While known for its oranges, Florida is the top producing sugarcane
state in the country.55 The industry is regulated by the Florida Forest
Service (FFS), which sets forth a list of Fire Weather Tools to ensure the
safety and protection of farmers and surrounding residents during
sugarcane burns.56 Sugarcane farmers are able to participate in training
available through a local community college to become certified burners,
but it is not required.57 Following a five-step smoke screening process set
forth by the FFS, however, is mandatory for all sugarcane farmers during
burns.58 This process includes plotting areas that will be impacted by
smoke in up to a thirty degree range; identifying smoke sensitive sites
versus critical smoke sensitive sites; identifying fuel type to be used during
the burn; and completing a risk minimization checklist, which includes
factors such as wind direction and speed.59 Although no permits are
required for burning in Florida,60 fees are necessary for training.61
On October 1, 2019, Florida’s Agriculture Commissioner, Nicole
Fried, and Florida Forest Service Director, Jim Karels, announced that the
state would be implementing additional requirements for prescribed
burns.62 With these new requirements, the air quality index must be taken
into consideration before an authorization will be granted for any burn in
the state.63 Specific to sugarcane burns, the Departments issued the
following updated regulations: (1) to reduce the risk of wildfire, there must
be an 80-acre minimum between wildlands and burning sugarcane fields
on days that are dry and windy; (2) nighttime burning is prohibited without
special permission from the Florida Forest Service director; (3) if a fog
advisory is in effect, burns are not permitted before 11 a.m.; and (4) where
field owners previously had 96 hours to put out muck fires, or fires that

55. Id. at 23.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 27.
61. Id.
62. Commissioner Nikki Fried Announces Major Changes to Prescribed
Burning, FLA. DEPT. AGRIC. & CONSUMER SERVS. (Oct. 1, 2019), https://www
.fdacs.gov/News-Events/Press-Releases/2019-Press-Releases/Commissioner-Nikk
i-Fried-Announces-Major-Changes-to-Prescribed-Burning [https://perma.cc/3EXF
-WFE3].
63. Id.
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burn under decomposing debris, they now have only 72 hours.64 Despite
already stringent guidelines getting stricter, Florida’s sugarcane industry
continues to boom.65
3. Texas
The guidelines for burning sugarcane in Texas are outlined by the
Outdoor Burning Rule set forth in Title 30 of the Texas Administrative
Code.66 This rule prohibits all outdoor burning unless it is expressly listed
as an exception.67 Naturally, sugarcane is an exception to the burning rule
so that farmers can complete their jobs.68
Texas sugarcane farmers must follow conditions set by the Texas
Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ).69 Under these conditions,
farmers may be required to give notice of burns to TCEQ.70 There is no
notice requirement for disposal burns of plant growth on-site; however,
disposal burns of crop residue, such as sugarcane, requires either oral or
written notice be given to TCEQ prior to the burn, although the time frame
for doing so is not apparent.71 The notice must include a map of the field,
the start and approximate end times of the burn, and the name of the farmer
responsible for the burn being conducted.72
Regardless of notice requirements, farmers are required to check for
“No Burn” warnings, which prohibit burning on certain days when
conditions make it more probable for fire to spread.73 Smoke and ash
should also refrain from entering a 300-foot radius of sensitive areas.74 The
TCEQ identifies sensitive areas for smoke and ash as including any area
that contains humans, livestock, or live vegetation.75 The only way that
farmers can burn within this radius of sensitive areas is with written
consent from the occupants and owner.76 Even with these strict standards
64. Id.
65. Florida grows sugarcane on 433,000 acres of land in the state. Fletcher,
supra note 40, at 23.
66. 30 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 111.201–111.221.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Fletcher, supra note 40, at 22.
70. TEX. COMM’N ON ENVTL. QUALITY, OUTDOOR BURNING IN TEXAS: FIELD
OPERATIONS 13 (2015).
71. Id. at 13.
72. Fletcher, supra note 40, at 22.
73. Id. at 22–23.
74. TEX. COMM’N ON ENVTL. QUALITY, supra note 70.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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for sugarcane farmers, there is still no civil remedy for affected
landowners.
II. BUNDLE OF RIGHTS AND CLAIMS TO PROTECT
Property rights for immovable property include the right “to possess,
use, and dispose” of the land that one owns.77 These rights are collectively
called the owner’s “bundle of rights,” so named to resemble a collection
of sticks in a bundle.78 Each type of property claim protects a different
stick in the bundle. It is widely accepted that the right to prevent intruders
from entering one’s land is the most important element of the bundle of
rights.79
A. Nuisance
A nuisance claim protects a different right than a trespass claim.80
While trespass claims protect exclusive possession of land, a claim in
nuisance protects and gives a remedy to a landowner for loss of the
exclusive use of his property.81 A plaintiff bringing a claim for nuisance
need not prove physical damage;82 however, the interference with use and
enjoyment of land must be intentional for a claim of nuisance or trespass
to prevail.83 Nuisance claims have traditionally been the major source of
77. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan Catv Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982)
(citing United States v. General Motors Corp. 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945)).
78. The “bundle of sticks” characterization of property rights is typically
found in common law. See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176
(1979) (“[s]ticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as
property . . .”). Civil law does have similar ideas.
79. See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 176; see also RICHARD R. POWELL,
POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, § 64A.01 (Michael Allen Wolf ed., 2000) (“The
modern trespass action has evolved into a means by which an owner of property
protects against intrusions onto the land or interferences with exclusive possession
of the land, a primary attribute of the possessory interest in property being the
power to exclude others from using it.”).
80. Borland v. Sanders Lead Co., 369 So. 2d 523, 527 (Ala. 1979) (citing
Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 342 P.2d 790 (1959)).
81. Id.; see SELMI & MANASTER, supra note 9.
82. Terence J. Centner, Damages from Pesticide Spray Drift under Trespass
Law, 41 ECOLOGY L. CURRENTS 1, 7 (2014) (citing Johnson v. Paynesville
Farmers Union Coop Oil Co., 817 N.W. 2d 693 (Minn. 2012)).
83. Mock v. Potlatch Corp., 786 F. Supp. 1545, 1549–50 (D. Idaho 1992)
(quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 13, at 71 (5th ed. 1984)).
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relief for intangible intrusions, such as particulate matter, smoke, light,
sound, or vibrations intruding onto another’s land.84 These intrusions are
not traditionally thought to be physical and direct, so much as indirect.85
In Louisiana, specifically, nuisance claims typically fall under Civil
Code articles 667 through 669, effectively prohibiting one landowner from
infringing upon his neighbor’s right to use his own property.86 Article 669
deals directly with smoke invasions, but it gives no specific framework for
proving the claim in its text.87 The Louisiana First Circuit has analyzed the
three articles as fitting together with each other.88 The court noted that
Article 667 prohibits acts that would cause damage or inconvenience to a
neighbor, while Article 668 contrasts to say that some inconveniences are
inescapable.89 The First Circuit went on to note that Article 669 indicates
that some inconveniences, no matter how necessary, are unacceptable;
examples in the text of the Article are industrial smoke and odors.90
Other jurisdictions have tended to follow the same scheme. For
instance, one court held that odors from a pig feeding lot did not fulfill
requirements to be a trespass because there was no physical entry onto the
land of the plaintiff.91 Thus, nuisance was the only remedy available to the
plaintiffs.92 As times change, however, some of these intrusions are
starting to be claimed under other areas of law in addition to nuisance.
B. Trespass
While there are many theories as to the history of the trespass claim,93
one thing has remained true through the years—a claim in trespass protects
84. See, e.g., Adams v. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co., 602 N.W.2d 215, 221
(Mich. Ct. App. 1999); see also Borland, 369 So. 2d at 528–29 (discussing Wilson
v. Parent, 365 P.2d 72 (1961)).
85. See Joseph F. Falcone III & Daniel Utain, Comment, You Can Teach an
Old Dog New Tricks: The Application of Common Law in Present-Day
Environmental Disputes, 11 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 59, 65–68 (2000).
86. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 667–669.
87. LA. CIV. CODE art. 669; see also, McGee v. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co., 206
La. 121, 19 So. 2d 21 (La. 1944).
88. Critney v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 353 So. 2d 341 (La. Ct. App. 1st
Cir. 1977).
89. Id. at 343.
90. Id.
91. Wendinger v. Forst Farms, Inc., 662 N.W.2d 546, 550 (Minn. App. 2003).
92. Id.
93. The following are four theories regarding where the claim of trespass
originated: 1) trespass is derived from the common law felony appeal, in order to
allow for the recovery of monetary damages for the value of stolen property,
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a landowner’s right to exclusive possession of the property.94 Contrary to
nuisance, a common law trespass claim necessitates only that a tangible
object, human or otherwise, enter the land of another and disturb the right
to exclusive possession that the property owner enjoys.95 Typically,
common law trespass claims require a physical presence on the land.96
Some jurisdictions today, including Alabama, Arkansas, California,
Florida, Kentucky, Maine, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, Oregon, and
Wyoming, are moving to a more modern view of trespass. 97 This modern
view allows plaintiffs to bring trespass claims for intrusions by both
tangible and intangible objects.98 In order to prove trespass by an
intangible object, a plaintiff must prove: “1) an invasion affecting an
interest in the exclusive possession of his property; 2) an intentional doing
of the act which results in the invasion; 3) reasonable foreseeability that
the act done could result in an invasion of the plaintiff’s possessory
interest; and 4) substantial damages to the res.”99
Direct versus indirect entry onto another’s land is a principle that once
helped to determine if a claim should be brought under trespass or
nuisance.100 Direct intrusions are seen most under the theory of trespass.101
An intrusion is deemed to be indirect if an intervening force carries the
substance onto the plaintiff’s land.102 For instance, if wind or water carries
pollutants onto a resident’s property, the intrusion is deemed indirect, and
residents suffering damage may be unable to recover under a claim of
where recovery of the property itself was unavailable; 2) trespass developed to
allow recovery of damages to stolen property, where only the recovery of the
property was otherwise allowed; 3) trespass arose as a specialized form of suit for
damages; 4) trespass was developed as a writ for remedy to breaches of the king’s
peace. POWELL, supra note 79.
94. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., supra note 9.
95. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1965);
Centner, supra note 82, at 5; Phillips v. Town of Many, 538 So. 2d 745, 746 (La.
Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1989) (quoting Patin v. Stockstill, 287 So. 2d 780 (La. Ct. App.
1st Cir. 1975)).
96. See Falcone III & Utain, supra note 85.
97. See Michael Axline, OR. UNIV. L. SCH., Toxic Torts Guide 1-3, § 3.06
(Sally Aiello rev. ed., 2015).
98. Centner, supra note 82, at 5.
99. Borland v. Sanders Lead Co., 369 So. 2d 523, 529 (Ala. 1979); see also,
Bradley v. Am. Smelting & Ref. Co., 709 P.2d 782 (Wash. 1985).
100. Adams v. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co., 602 N.W.2d 215, 224 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1999).
101. Id.
102. Id. (quoting Williams v. Oeder, 103 Ohio App. 3d 333, 338, n.2 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1995)).
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trespass.103 Since these ideas of direct and indirect often carry harsh results
for plaintiffs that would not allow recovery when it is warranted, the
principle has been discontinued in most courts today.104 Generally, courts
rely simply on the classification of materials as either tangible or
intangible.105
The question of whether an intrusion is caused by the tangible or
intangible is the subject of much debate.106 The court in Martin v. Reynolds
Metals Co. acknowledged that minute particles collectively causing
invasion and physical intrusion would clearly form a trespass claim “but
for the size of the particle.”107 In Martin, a defendant aluminum reduction
plant was accused of causing fluoride compounds in gases and particulate
matter to be released onto plaintiff residents’ property.108 Plaintiffs alleged
damage to their land, contending that they could no longer graze their
cattle or allow the cattle to drink the water, which was contaminated by
the particles.109 The defendant, Reynolds, argued that a trespass is only
actionable where there is a direct invasion, rather than a consequential
invasion.110 Similarly, Reynolds urged that all intrusions involving minute
particles and materials must fall under nuisance claims.111
The Martin court refused to rule in favor of the defendant company on
either of their arguments.112 Rather than the dimensional test laid out by
Reynolds, the Oregon Supreme Court adopted a “force and energy” test,
which allows trespass claims to prevail as long as modern science is able
to perceive the “molecular and atomic world of small particles” that make
up the intruding material.113 The court explained its theory by saying that
“[t]he force [of particulate matter intrusions] is just as real if it is chemical
103. Id.
104. Id. (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS § 13, at 71 (5th ed. 1984)).
105. See, e.g., Borland v. Sanders Lead Co., 369 So. 2d 523, 527 (Ala. 1979)
(discussing the rise of the “fictitious ‘dimensional’ test”) (citing 1 HARPER &
JAMES, TORTS, § 1.23 (1946)).
106. Id. at 527–28; Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 342 P.2d 790, 792–93 (Or.
1959); Lunda v. Matthews, 613 P.2d 63 (Or. Ct. App. 1980); Thackery v. Union
Portland Cement Co., 231 P. 813 (Utah 1924).
107. Martin, 342 P.2d at 792.
108. Id. at 791.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 792.
112. Id. at 793.
113. Martin, 342 P.2d at 793. See also Borland v. Sanders Lead Co., 369 So.
2d 523, 527–28 (Ala. 1979) (citing Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 342 P.2d 790
(Or. 1959)).
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in nature and must be awakened by the intervention of another agency
before it does harm.”114 In other words, the Martin court believed that
indirect invasions, which necessitate another agent to carry them to a
landowner’s property in order to do harm, are still considered invasions
under trespass because of their ability and probability to cause harm to the
land and residents. Therefore, intrusions by particulate matter, under the
Martin theory, can be considered trespass, as well as nuisance, if the matter
can be measured by senses and, more importantly, science.115
Other courts have stated that allowing intangible material trespass
claims forms a line between trespass and nuisance that is unidentifiable
and blurred.116 Asserting that nuisance and trespass claims can be brought
in the same action does not mean that they no longer protect separate
rights.117 Each claim still identifies with a certain strand in the bundle of
rights, but now the claims overlap more than they have in the past.
The substantial damage element of the modern theory of trespass is an
ambiguous concept. There are no court cases directly answering the
question of what constitutes “substantial damage” for the purposes of
satisfying this element.118 The Oregon Supreme Court, in Wilson v. Parent,
clearly noted that if the damage to the res, or property, is de minimis, or
minimal, there can be no action in trespass.119 Because the Wilson court
primarily analyzed a claim for nuisance, it noted that while the damage to
the res may be de minimis, the damage to the use and enjoyment of the
property can still be substantial, thus resulting in preclusion of trespass
claim but allowing recovery for nuisance.120 Considering this case in
conjunction with the theory that trespass and nuisance are not mutually
114. Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 342 P.2d 790, 794 (1959).
115. See id. at 792.
116. Bradley v. Am. Smelting & Ref. Co., 709 P.2d 782, 787–88 (Wash.
1985). (quoting W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW §2.13, at 154–57 (1977)
(“Today . . . the line between trespass and nuisance has become ‘wavering and
uncertain.’”)).
117. Borland, 369 So. 2d at 527.
118. While no case specifically defines what “substantial damage” means, the
court in Borland explains that “actionable damage to the res” is “caused by such
acts usually result[ing] in a diminution of the use value of the property.” Further,
the court stated that damage to the res interferes with an owner’s right to exclusive
possession. Id. at 530.
119. See Wilson v. Parent, 365 P.2d 72 (Or. 1961) (holding that a son-in-law’s
hand gestures and obscene words yelled across neighboring property constituted
only a nuisance because it was “reasonably obvious” that the damage was de
minimis).
120. Id. at 72.
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exclusive claims,121 it is reasonable to conclude that other outcomes are
possible as well: damage to the use and enjoyment may be de minimis,
while damage to the res is substantial; or damage to both the use and
enjoyment and to the res may be equally substantial, thus satisfying a
claim in both trespass and nuisance.
In common law trespass, an intruder usually needs intent only to enter the
land of another person.122 Mistake of law or mistake of fact is not a defense
for common law claims of trespass.123 Therefore, claiming ignorance as to the
ownership of the land does not avoid liability for a trespass claim.124 Most
importantly, intent in common law trespass has been held to extend to those
who would be knowledgeable of the results of their actions.125 If the same
policies apply to the intent element of the modern theory of trespass as they
do to the intent element in common law trespass, then a claim can only be
successful if the defendant had the intention to cause the intrusion, or else had
a “reasonable foreseeability that the act done could result in invasion.”126
C. Negligence
The theory of negligence is another tort claim that may help landowners
recover for particulate matter invasions. As it stands, Louisiana sugarcane
farmers are protected from liability for damages unless they are proven
negligent in their burning practices.127 In Louisiana, negligence is typically
analyzed based on a duty-risk analysis.128 The five elements to a negligence
analysis are: (1) duty, (2) breach, (3) cause-in-fact, (4) scope, and (5)
damages.129

121. Borland v. Sanders Land Co., 369 So. 2d 523, 528 (Ala. 1979).
122. Centner, supra note 82, at 5 (noting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 158 (AM. LAW INST. 1965)).
123. See Centner, supra note 82, at 5.
124. See id.
125. Id. (citing State v. Courchesne, 998 A.2d 1, 103 (Conn. 2010) (noting that
“the fact finder may infer intent from the natural consequences of one’s voluntary
conduct”); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 (AM. LAW INST.
1965) (under which intent “is limited to the consequences of the act,” even if not
intended).
126. Mock v. Potlatch Corp., 786 F. Supp. 1545, 1549–50 (D. Idaho 1992)
(citing Maddy v. Vulcan Materials Co., 737 F. Supp. 1528, 1540 (D. Kan. 1990)
(quoting Borland v. Sanders Lead Co., 369 So. 2d 523, 529 (Ala. 1979))).
127. LA. REV. STAT. § 3:17(E) (2016).
128. Racca v. St. Mary Sugar Coop., Inc., 872 So. 2d 1117, 1122 (La. Ct. App.
1st Cir. 2004).
129. Id.
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The duty element contends that a defendant has a standard of care that
he is expected to live up to and follow, while the breach element comes
into play when the defendant fails to conform to that duty.130 The causein-fact element of negligence says that the defendant’s noncompliance
with the expected standard of care for his industry is the main cause of the
plaintiff’s injuries.131 In other words, had the defendant met his standard
of care, the plaintiff would not have suffered damages. Scope indicates
that there is a legal remedy for the plaintiff and that the defendant’s
conduct was the legal cause of the plaintiff’s injuries. Finally, the plaintiff
must prove that he did in fact suffer actual damages.132 In order to avoid
being liable for negligence, a defendant must only negate one of the five
elements.133 When one element fails, the entire claim fails. Therefore, in
the case of sugarcane farmers, only allowing plaintiffs to bring claims for
negligence affords far weaker remedies and fewer successes.
III. COURTS SPLIT TOO FREQUENTLY OVER THE ISSUE OF INTANGIBLE
TRESPASS
Without much rhyme or reason, courts have split over whether to
allow particulate matter intrusions to be claimed under trespass or whether
to require the actions to be brought under nuisance.134
A. Permitting Recovery Under Claims of Trespass
Some courts have recognized the more modern view of the trespass
claim and allowed plaintiffs to recover under trespass for particulate
matter intrusions. In B&R Luncheonette, Inc. v. Fairmont Theatre Corp.,
a theatre was held liable for trespass when mist from a cooling tower fell
onto the neighboring luncheonette’s property.135 The New York court’s
analysis centered on the idea that the plaintiff could not use the property
for the purposes intended, namely as an outdoor garden, because of the
mist.136

130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See, e.g., Lunda v. Matthews, 613 P.2d 63 (Or. Ct. App. 1980); Thackery
v. Union Portland Cement Co., 231 P. 813 (Utah 1924).
135. B & R Luncheonette, Inc. v. Fairmont Theatre Corp., 103 N.Y.S.2d 747
(NY App. Div. 1951).
136. Id.
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In Ream v. Keen, the Oregon Supreme Court held that smoke from the
burning of a nearby grassy field was a material entering property, thus
constituting a trespass.137 Relying on the test set forth in Martin, the Ream
court determined that the nature of the smoke intrusion on the plaintiff’s
property was not trivial, the smoke was tangible, and thus, the intrusion
and trespass could not be ignored.138 Furthermore, in Lunda v. Matthews,
plaintiffs recovered under trespass in an action brought against a defendant
cement company that allowed dust from the cement plant to float onto
plaintiffs’ land.139
Most notably, the Alabama Supreme Court, in Borland v. Sanders
Lead Co., held that trespass was actionable for a plaintiff who claimed lead
particulates and sulfoxide gases were being transported onto his property
from a neighboring smelting company.140 The Borlands owned property
on which they raised cattle, grew crops, and owned a pecan orchard.141
Sanders Lead Company began a business in 1968 that specialized in
recovering lead from used car batteries.142 Sanders Lead Company was
located just across the road from the Borlands’ property.143 On the edge of
their land, nearest to the Borlands, the Company placed equipment with
an installed filter system to prevent lead particles from being emitted into
the air.144 The filter system caught fire twice and did not function
properly.145 The Borlands contended that lead and sulfoxide particles were
deposited onto their land, causing a “dangerous accumulation.”146
The trial court held that because defendants complied with the
Alabama Air Pollution Control Act,147 they were immune from all liability
that would result from their business.148 Further, the trial court stated that
the Borlands’ land increased in value based on its proximity to the lead
plant, and thus, the plaintiffs could not recover.149 The appellate court
reversed the trial court, stating that the Alabama Air Pollution Control Act

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
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Borland v. Sanders Lead Co., 369 So. 2d 523 (Ala. 1979).
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Id.
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Id. at 526.
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expressly states that it does not limit liability.150 Additionally, the court
held that precluding recovery based on increased land value is strictly
impermissible.151 In order to allow the plaintiffs to recover under trespass,
the court relied on the test set out in Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., which
determines that a trespass claim can be brought for an intangible intrusion
if the material can be perceived by modern science.152 The court also set
out the requirement that plaintiffs prove damage to property in order for
an intangible intrusion to be recoverable under trespass.153
B. Denying Recovery Under Claims of Trespass
On the other hand, some courts have persistently held that trespass is
solely for tangible materials.154 These courts have ruled that the only
remedy for plaintiffs claiming intrusion or interference from intangible
items or particulate matter is a claim in nuisance.155 Some courts have
criticized the Martin theory that particulate matter can be considered
worthy of a trespass claim.156 For example, the court in Ryan v.
Emmetsburg denied an action in trespass brought by plaintiffs
complaining of gases and odors coming from a garbage disposal plant,
rationalizing that trespass must be a natural and physical intrusion by
tangible material.157 The court went on to say that these intangible
intrusions, such as odors or gases, should be classified solely as nuisance
claims.158
Further, in a stark contrast to Lunda,159 the Utah Supreme Court in
Thackery v. Union Portland Cement Co. held that a landowner could not
recover for trespass from a cement company that allegedly allowed dust,
smoke, and small particles of cement to settle onto the plaintiff’s
property.160 The court held that the cement company was free from liability
150. Id. (citing ALA. CODE § 22-28-23 (2019)).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 527–28.
153. Id. at 529.
154. See, e.g., Thackery v. Union Portland Cement Co., 231 P. 813 (Utah
1924); Johnson v. Paynesville Farmers Union Coop. Oil Co., 817 N.W.2d 693
(Minn. 2012).
155. See, e.g., Thackery, 231 P. at 813; Johnson, 817 N.W.2d at 693.
156. Johnson, 817 N.W.2d at 703 (citing John Larkin Inc. v. Marceau, 959
A.2d 551, 555 (Vt. 2008)).
157. Ryan v. Emmetsburg, 4 N.W.2d 435 (Iowa 1942).
158. Id. at 435.
159. Lunda v. Matthews, 613 P.2d 63 (Or. Ct. App. 1980).
160. Thackery, 231 P. at 813.
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because it did not directly commit an act which “interfered with the
physical occupancy of the premises.”161
Additionally, in John Larkin, Inc. v. Marceau, the Vermont Supreme
Court stated that because “the ambient environment always contains
particulate matter from many sources,” opening trespass claims up to
particulate matter intrusions “subject[s] countless persons and entities to
automatic liability for trespass absent any demonstrated injury.”162 The
courts in both Bradley v. American Smelting & Refining Co.163 and
Borland164 quickly addressed this floodgate issue by reminding defendants
of the requirement that it be “reasonably foreseeable that the intangible
matter ‘result in an invasion of plaintiff’s possessory interest,’ and that the
invasion caused ‘substantial damages’ to the plaintiff’s property.”165 The
Borland court effectively suggested recovery would not be as easy as
claiming that dust from a neighbor’s property traveled onto a resident’s
land by a gust of wind, but rather that the resident would have to prove
that the neighbor caused the effect and could have known that the dust
would have traveled there.166
IV. REFORMING THE LAW TO PROTECT RESIDENTS AGAINST
SUGARCANE RESIDUE
Particulate matter intrusion, specifically from sugarcane residue, is an
area of the law that needs revision. Pursuant to Louisiana’s Right to Farm
Act, plaintiffs are typically only afforded relief if they can prove
negligence on the part of sugarcane farmers.167 Plaintiffs should be able to
recover under any state tort claim that suits their needs if they are harmed
by ash and smoke from sugarcane burning.168 Additionally, courts are
161. Larry D. Scheafer, Annotation, Recovery in Trespass for Injury to Land
Caused by Airborne Pollutants, 2 A.L.R.4th 1054 (2020) (discussing Thackery,
231 P. at 813).
162. John Larkin, Inc. v. Marceau, 959 A.2d 551, 555 (Vt. 2008); see also,
Johnson v. Paynesville Farmers Union Coop. Oil Co., 817 N.W.2d 693 (Minn.
2012).
163. Bradley v. Am. Smelting & Ref. Co.,709 P.2d 782, 791 (Wash. 1985).
164. Borland v. Sanders Lead Co., 369 So. 2d 523, 529 (Ala. 1979).
165. Johnson, 817 N.W.2d at 703 (citing Borland, 369 So. 2d at 529; accord
Bradley, 709 P.2d at 791); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 cmt.
l (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
166. Borland, 369 So. 2d at 529.
167. LA. REV. STAT. § 3:17(E) (2016).
168. During several cases of claims for trespass or nuisance, defendants have
urged that plaintiffs have no right of action when it comes to particulate matter,
smoke, or the like floating through the air because federal law has preempted all
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extremely indecisive about what constitutes tangible or intangible
materials, and Louisiana courts specifically have not dealt with the issue
on a notable scale.169 Laws regarding intangible intrusions and sugarcane
farmer liability must be reformed to protect residents, while allowing
farmers to continue their jobs.
A. Negligence is Not an Adequate Remedy for Particulate Matter
Intrusions
As discussed above, at least one Louisiana court has allowed plaintiffs
to recover in nuisance for particulate matter intrusions on their property.170
To avoid deterring the sugarcane economy, however, the Right to Farm
Act grants immunity to sugarcane farmers if they are not proven negligent
in their burning practices. Thus, farmers are protected from claims in
trespass and nuisance.171 Some farmers may argue that there is no need for
residents to bring an action against them in trespass or nuisance if they can
recover under negligence. Unfortunately, negligence is a very distinct tort
claim.172
Negligence requires that a plaintiff prove that the defendant had a duty
to exercise a certain standard of care; failed to meet that standard; the
failure was a direct cause of injury; the failure was a legal cause of the
injury; and there were actual damages.173 In Louisiana, the Louisiana
Smoke Management Guidelines for Sugarcane Harvesting are solely
voluntary.174 While the Guidelines do constitute a standard of care, it is
difficult to prove that sugarcane farmers have an express duty to follow
state tort claims dealing with air pollution. See, e.g., Merrick v. Diageo Ams.
Supply Inc., 805 F.3d 685 (6th Cir. 2015). It is well settled, though, that the
Environmental Protection Agency’s Clean Air Act has a states’ rights savings
clause that allows states to regulate air pollution by offenders. 42 U.S.C. § 7416
(2012); see, e.g., Merrick, 805 F.3d at 690. The rationale is that the EPA regulates
only acceptable national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS), but states are
left to make their own regulations concerning how these standards are met. See,
e.g., Merrick, 805 F.3d at 691. Therefore, trespass claims can be brought under
state tort laws for actions resulting from incidents such as sugarcane burns.
169. See Lunda v. Matthews, 613 P.2d 63 (Or. Ct. App. 1980); Thackery v.
Union Portland Cement Co., 231 P. 813 (Utah 1924).
170. Critney v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 353 So. 2d 341 (La. Ct. App. 1st
Cir. 1977). See also discussion supra Section II.A.
171. LA. REV. STAT. § 3:17(E) (2016).
172. See supra Section II.C.
173. Racca v. St. Mary Sugar Coop., Inc., 872 So. 2d 1117, 1122 (La. Ct. App.
1st Cir. 2004).
174. LA. DEP’T OF AGRIC. & FORESTRY & LSU AGCENTER, supra note 12, at 1.
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this standard when the procedures are not mandated by the State.
Therefore, negligence claims based on a farmer’s noncompliance with
voluntary state guidelines would likely fail on the first element of the dutyrisk analysis alone. If farmers are not required to comply with the Smoke
Management Guidelines, there must be some other set of standards that
farmers in the fields follow in order to practice their burning techniques
and set a standard of care.175
Additionally, some sugarcane farmers may say that they cannot be
liable for the smoke and ash if they are responsible with the management
and care of the actual fires. In Roseberry v. L.O. Brayton & Co., the
Louisiana First Circuit held that the general rule for fires is that the “person
who intentionally kindles a fire on his premises for a lawful purpose is
liable for damages resulting therefrom if he is negligent either in starting
it or in guarding against its spread.”176 The court went on to say that the
fire starter has a duty to exercise reasonable care in managing the fire from
start to finish.177 One could argue, though, that there is a major difference
between being responsible for a fire and being responsible for the smoke
and ash that results from the fire. In the Roseberry case, the issue arose
when an unattended stump that was still smoldering relit, and the fire
spread to an adjoining property.178 This lack of attendance to a fire can
signify negligence on the part of sugarcane farmers as well, but failing to
mitigate smoke and ash damage is a different situation entirely.
Finally, allowing negligence claims to succeed for ash and smoke
residue that blows on to adjacent properties opens questions of where to
draw the line in litigation rights. To plaintiffs in litigation with sugarcane
farmers, suits are often about more than just recovering for damages.179
These landowners are working to protect their possessory interests and
175. It should be noted that a research of experienced farmers showed that
sugarcane farmers prefer intuition, or prior experience and handling problems as
a whole based on the way they look and feel, rather than analytical data. Fletcher,
supra note 40, 8–9.
176. Roseberry v. L.O. Brayton & Co., 4 So. 2d 777, 779 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir.
1941).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 778.
179. Notably, some Florida residents banded to seek class action status in a June
2019 lawsuit against twelve sugarcane companies, alleging that sugarcane burning
exposed them chemicals, health risks, property damages, and devaluation of
property. The lawsuit was filed in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida and was allotted to Judge Rodney Smith. Complaint, Clover
Coffie, et al. v. U.S. Sugar Company, et al., (S.D. Fla. 2019) (e No. 9:19-cv-80730),
https://www.classaction.org/media/coffie-et-al-v-florida-crystals-corporation-et-al
.pdf [https://perma.cc/XX3B-AREW].
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property that often has monetary and sentimental value to them. Trespass
and nuisance claims are needed to protect these specific concerns of
landowners. If negligence can be brought in place of these express claims,
courts expand the theory of negligence to a wider range of scenarios.
Negligence, in this case, could go so far as to include intentional acts
causing infringement on a neighbor’s property. This result is far more than
the theory is intended to encompass. Negligence is useful to hold
sugarcane farmers liable if they fail to monitor their burns properly or
otherwise fail to take all necessary and mandatory precautions for a safe
field burn, but trespass or nuisance claims are also needed to protect
landowners’ right to exclusive possession and use and to ensure that claims
are legitimate so that the floodgates of litigation remain closed.
B. Court Actions and the Reformation of the Law
Court opinions on the modern theory of trespass in relation to
particulate matter resulting from industrial processes could be the starting
point of improved burning practices and regulations in Louisiana. Courts
must be consistent in determining whether specific particulate matter
counts as an intangible or tangible intrusion. Because of an absence in
uniformity, courts are free to recognize materials, such as smoke and ash,
as tangibles in one case, while another court presented with the same facts
may decide that the material is an intangible inappropriate for a trespass
claim.180
A second area of the trespass law requiring reformation for particulate
matter cases is the element of intent. Cases and courts have long differed
on what constitutes intent, but intent inquiries are often far more fact
intensive than some other elements of torts.181 Still, to adequately resolve
the issue of particulate matter trespass claims, there must be a uniform
decision among Louisiana courts as to what constitutes the actor’s intent.
180. See, e.g., Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 342 P.2d 790, 791, (1959)
(holding that fluoride compounds released and landing on plaintiff’s land
constituted a trespass); Borland v. Sanders Lead Co., 369 So. 2d 523, 526 (Ala.
1979) (holding that a buildup of lead particles on a plaintiff’s land constituted a
trespass); Bradley v. Am. Smelting & Ref. Co., 709 P.2d 782, 784 (Wash. 1985)
(holding that heavy metal particles are able to be considered under a claim for
trespass).
181. MCI Commc’ns. Servs. v. Hagan, 74 So. 3d 1148 (La. 2011); Dual
Drilling Co. v. Mills Equip. Invs., 721 So. 2d 853 (La. 1998). See, e.g., Johnson
v. Paynesville Farmers Union Coop. Oil Co., 817 N.W.2d 693 (Minn. 2012)
(citing Borland, 369 So. 2d at 529); accord Bradley, 104 Wn. 2d 677. See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 cmt. l (AM. LAW. INST. 1965.
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In order to resolve the issue and find a common ground for all courts to
rely on, the Louisiana legislature must reform the law of trespass to make
it clearer and more easily construed. The legislature of any state is the most
obvious choice for starting reformation because lawmakers are in the best
position to reconcile the most difficult differences and reach a resolution
that will be uniform for all cases.182
1. Legislative Reformation of the Substantial Damage Requirement
in Trespass
The Martin court made a clear implication that, when science and
senses can measure particulate matter invading a neighbor’s property,
courts should analyze the intrusion the same way that they would analyze
an intrusion by bigger particles or objects.183 While light and sound are
made of detectable particles, particulate matter differs in that it can settle
onto property, causing unique issues for residents and the land that may
go undetected for some time.
While tangible trespass claims do not require a showing of damages,
intangible trespass claims do.184 Both tangibles and intangibles can cause
damage, but the difference for intangible materials resides in the delay
before damages are identifiable. Intangibles, such as smoke and ash, may
cause immediate sediment settlement on land, prompting an action for
trespass under the modern theory of intangible intrusions, but the same ash
and smoke may cause health problems for residents. These health issues
can range from immediate breathing problems and allergic reactions to
asthmatic issues that do not present themselves for several months or
years.185

182. See Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of
Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 965, 1032–33 (2004) (“In light of their greater expertise
and ability to deal with the problem on a field-wide basis, these statutory and
administrative schemes are probably more successful than a judicial conservation
governance regime could have been.”).
183. Martin, 342 P.2d at 790.
184. See id. at 795; Bradley, 709 P.2d at 790–91; Borland, 369 So. 2d at 530.
185. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC),
dust, dirt, soot, smoke, and drops of liquid, which can result from sugarcane
burning, are all intangible particles, or particulate matter, that pose health
concerns. Some health risks identified by the CDC include eye irritation, lung and
throat irritation, breathing difficulties, and lung cancer. Particle Pollution, CTRS.
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/air/particulate
_matter.html [https://perma.cc/Q9HN-57PV] (last visited Feb. 2, 2020).
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Additionally, the regular presence of heavy smoke may cause a
devaluation of property, but this devaluation may not be recognized until
plaintiffs try to sell their property years later and realize that no one is
interested in buying the land because of the close proximity to burning
sugarcane fields. The problem that arises from delayed damages and the
requirement of substantial damage in the modern theory of trespass is the
possibility that prescriptive periods have elapsed by the time damages
present themselves. Both trespass and negligence claims have a
prescriptive period of one year.186 Thus, the landowners would be barred
from bringing claims under these theories if damages arose more than one
year after the smoke and ash drift.
As previously discussed, the Louisiana First Circuit has analyzed
particulate matter invasions under the law of nuisance.187 Typically,
Louisiana courts have applied a longer or suspended prescriptive period to
actions for nuisance.188 Even so, the prescriptive periods under trespass
and negligence mean that plaintiffs are restricted to bringing a nuisance
claim for the damage sustained as a result of the smoke and ash intrusions.
Yet, nuisance claims limit the remedies that plaintiffs are afforded, with
injunctions being the most common, and the claims do not serve to fully
protect harmed residents from their serious concerns for their property.
This delayed damage aspect demonstrates the need for reformation of
the substantial damage requirement for intangible intrusions. While it is
admittedly unreasonable to rid the modern theory of trespass altogether of
a requirement that will distinguish actual claims from frivolous claims, it
is arguable that the substantial damage requirement is not the proper way
to go about the analysis. There must be some way to distinguish between
substantial intangible trespass claims and frivolous intangible trespass
claims. A reasonable substitution for the substantial damage element may
186. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3492 (2019).
187. See discussion supra Section II.A; see also, Critney v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 353 So. 2d 341 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1977). The adequateness of
Louisiana Civil Code articles 667–669, as a whole, is important, but outside the
scope of this Article.
188. See Dean v. Hercules, Inc., 328 So. 2d 69 (La. 1976) (holding that
prescription for a nuisance claim would run from the date damage became
apparent); see also Craig v. Montelepre Realty Co., 252 La. 502, 211 So. 2d 627
(La. 1968) (holding that the prescriptive period of one year “is without merit for
the evidence unmistakably shows that the operating cause of the injury is a
continuous one, giving rise to successive damages from day to day, and, under
our law, in such cases prescription, whatever the length of time, has no
application.” (quoting Devoke v. Yazoo & M.V.R. Co., 211 La. 729, 30 So. 2d
816, 822 (La. 1947)).
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be simply to follow the same rationale and reasoning presented by the
Martin court when it determined what constituted an intangible material
worthy of a trespass claim.189 In other words, the Louisiana Legislature or
other governing bodies could impose a requirement that to bring a claim
in trespass for an intangible material intrusion, there must be some proof
of actual presence of the particulate matter. For instance, the ash and
smoke produced by sugarcane burning, just like pesticides or dust,190 must
be detected, visually observed, and measured by the senses and science.
On the other hand, claims for intrusions of light and sound would still be
limited to nuisance because there is no actual presence of substantial
atomic particles present on the land. The resulting harm from intrusions
by light and sound particles “settling” on the land is not only de minimis
and virtually nonexistent,191 but there is no easy way to measure the
amount drifting specifically onto a plaintiff’s land. These claims for
trespass based on intrusions of light and sound can and should be
dismissed as frivolous through vehicles of summary judgment and the like.
2. The Doctrine of Contra Non Valentem for Particulate Matter
Trespass
Prescription is the time granted for a harmed person to bring a claim
for the damage suffered.192 While the prescriptive period for trespass is
one year,193 prescription can be suspended or interrupted.194 Louisiana
recognizes the jurisprudential doctrine of contra non valentem agere nulla
currit praescriptio (contra non valentem) in an effort to give harmed
parties a way to suspend prescriptive periods when necessary or
justifiable.195 The doctrine is traditionally applied in three circumstances:
(1) where there is a cause which prevented the court from recognizing the
plaintiff’s action; (2) where there is a condition of a contract which
prevents the action from being brought; or (3) where the defendant has
189. Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 342 P.2d 790, 792 (1959) (holding that if
science is able to perceive the “molecular and atomic world of small particles”
that make up the intruding material, then the material can be considered an
intrusion for a claim of trespass).
190. See generally Lunda v. Matthews, 613 P.2d 63 (Or. Ct. App. 1980).
191. See Wilson v. Parent, 365 P.2d 72 (1961).
192. Benjamin West Janke, Revisiting Contra Non Valentem in Light of
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, 68 LA. L. REV. 498, 500 (2008).
193. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3492 (2019).
194. Janke, supra note 192.
195. Id. The Latin phrase translates to “a prescription does not run against one
who is unable to act.”
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prevented the plaintiff from availing himself of the action.196 Louisiana
courts have more recently applied contra non valentem in a fourth
instance, which involves the cause of action not being known or knowable
to the plaintiff by no fault of his own or of the defendant.197
This fourth application of the doctrine is suitable for landowners
wishing to bring a trespass suit against sugarcane farmers when the
damage does not present itself until after the one-year mark. Nevertheless,
there are some hurdles a plaintiff must overcome to prove that contra non
valentem is appropriate. The Louisiana Second Circuit, in Quick v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co., stated that prescription begins to run when the
plaintiff has actual or constructive knowledge of the tortious act, actual or
constructive knowledge of the damage, and the causal relationship
between the act and the harm.198 The Louisiana Supreme Court defined
constructive knowledge as “whatever is notice enough to excite attention
and put the owner on his guard and call for inquiry.”199
In the case of sugarcane field burning affecting a landowner, it is
possible that the landowner may have actual or constructive knowledge of
the tortious act without having knowledge of the damage itself. For
example, if a landowner does not develop asthma or other respiratory
issues until more than a year after the initial field burning, he cannot be
said to have had knowledge of the respiratory damage caused by the
burning. Thus, he should be able to use the doctrine of contra non valentem
to recover damages against the sugarcane farmer as long as there is a
causal link between the smoke or ash and respiratory conditions. Contra
non valentem is one feasible way to solve the delayed damages concerned
facing landowners harmed by sugarcane burning practices.
3. Legislative Reformation of the Intent Element of Trespass
In a trespass claim, a proper analysis regards an actor’s intention to
commit the initial act, rather than his intention to interfere with property
rights or use and enjoyment of land. Specifically, a sugarcane farmer’s
liability should be determined based on the knowledge the farmer has
gained from conducting research into the areas around their farm, coupled
with the exercise, or lack thereof, of reasonable care to protect those

196. Reynolds v. Batson, 11 La. Ann. 729, 730 (La. 1856).
197. Corsey v. State Dep’t of Corr., 375 So. 2d 1319, 1322 (La. 1979).
198. Quick v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 347 So. 2d 59 (La. Ct. App. 2d
Cir. 1977).
199. Cartwright v. Chrysler Corp., 255 La. 598, 603–04 (La. 1970).
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areas.200 As the Bradley and Borland courts mentioned, to avoid a
floodgate issue, trespass claims for intangible materials can only be
successful if the defendant can reasonably foresee that the material will
end up on the plaintiff’s property.201 Sugarcane farmers participating in the
Louisiana Smoke Management Program complete a detailed packet to
determine the wind direction, how far ash and smoke will travel, and what
residential or other properties are located around their fields.202 Therefore,
it is arguable that they can more than reasonably foresee that their ash and
smoke will end up on plaintiffs’ properties when they choose to burn the
fields.
Courts do not always easily determine the intent element of trespass.
In Dual Drilling Co. v. Mills Equipment Investments, the Louisiana
Supreme Court analyzed a claim for conversion of a rig, in which a
company was contracted to cut pieces of the rig but cut the wrong piece.203
The piece that was cut did not belong to the person employing the
contractor.204 Additionally, the contractor cutting the rig was warned that
the piece he was about to cut did not belong to the person who employed
him, yet he cut it anyway.205 The court determined that the contractor
cutting the rig was liable for damages resulting from conversion of the
property.206 The specific rule the court used was that the company “knew
or should have known” that the rig belonged to someone else but failed to
confirm the identification of the true owner.207
Similarly, in MCI Communications Services v. Hagan, plaintiffs
asserted that the defendant should be held liable for trespass to chattel even
when the trespass is inadvertent and unintentional, but the Louisiana
200. Borland holds that engaging in an act that will reasonably result in
particulate matter being transmitted onto the property of another is enough to
constitute a trespass. Borland v. Sanders Lead Co., 369 So. 2d 523, 528 (Ala.
1979).
201. Johnson v. Paynesville Farmers Union Coop. Oil Co., 817 N.W.2d 693,
703 (Minn. 2012) (citing Borland, 369 So. 2d at 529; accord Bradley v. Am.
Smelting & Ref. Co., 104 Wn.2d 677, 709 P.2d 782, 791 (Wash. 1985). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 cmt. l (AM. LAW. INST. 1965).
202. LA. DEP’T OF AGRIC. & FORESTRY & LSU AGCENTER, supra note 12.
203. Dual Drilling Co. v. Mills Equip. Invs., 721 So. 2d 853 (La. 1998);
Conversion is a tort claim in which an owner of a movable, also called chattel, is
dispossessed of the movable by way of an unlawful interference with the object
and ownership. Id. at 857.
204. Id. at 855.
205. Id. at 857.
206. Id. at 858.
207. Id. at 857.
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Supreme Court held that this contention was incorrect.208 In this case, a
defendant owned a piece of property that had an underground cable
belonging to MCI running across it, yet MCI did not have a servitude on
the property.209 Defendants used a backhoe on the property and
accidentally struck the cable, severing the cable in the process.210 The court
in this case determined that, in order to commit a trespass to chattel, intent
to interfere with another person’s interest in the movable property is
required.211 Because defendants had no knowledge of the underground
cable and did not intentionally sever the cable, there could be no trespass
claim.212
In both Dual Drilling and MCI, the Louisiana Supreme Court rejected
the idea of placing liability on an actor who did not have intent to cause an
interference with another’s property.213 Essentially, the court rejected strict
liability; the Louisiana Supreme Court prefers that actors know or should
know that their actions will result in harm to others.214 Sugarcane farmers
and their burns satisfy the intent requirements set forth in Dual Drilling
and MCI. Farmers are aware of the residential areas, highways, airports,
schools, or other such sites that surround their fields. Even if they do not
participate in the Louisiana Smoke Management Guidelines, they have
knowledge that the wind is blowing in some respect during their burn and
that this wind will cause the smoke and ash to travel. Having knowledge
that smoke and ash has the potential to travel lends to the effect that
farmers “know or should know” that the smoke and ash will travel onto
surrounding residential properties, and therefore, farmers should take
proactive measures to determine who will be affected and take precautions
to protect these areas. Failure to take these measures should result in the
requisite intent necessary to support a claim in trespass.

208. MCI Commc’ns. Servs. v. Hagan, 74 So. 3d 1148 (La. 2011).
209. Id. at 1149–51.
210. Id. at 1149.
211. Id. at 1154 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 217 (AM. LAW
INST. 1965)).
212. Id. at 1155.
213. Dual Drilling Co. v. Mills Equip. Invs., 721 So. 2d 853, 857 (La. 1998);
MCI Commc’ns. Servs., 74 So. 3d at 1155.
214. Strict liability is defined as “liability that does not depend on proof of
negligence or intent to do harm but that is based instead on a duty to compensate
the harms proximately caused by the activity or behavior subject to the liability
rule.” Strict liability, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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C. Modifications in the Sugarcane Industry
Louisiana has some of the most relaxed and lenient guidelines when it
comes to regulation of sugarcane burning and the sugarcane industry. In
order to protect both farmers from suits and residents from unnecessary
smoke and ash intrusion, the regulation of the state’s sugarcane industry
needs to undergo a reformation that will hold farmers liable for extensive
damage to surrounding landowners resulting from their burns.
1. More Stringent Regulations of Burning Practices
Louisiana’s policymakers and the Louisiana Department of
Agriculture should work to enforce stricter guidelines in the area of ash
and smoke management by way of mandatory implantation or strong
incentives for farmers to partake in management techniques. While the
Louisiana Smoke Management Guidelines for Sugarcane Harvesting is a
helpful tool, it must be made mandatory for all sugarcane farmers in the
state to ensure uniform burning techniques and adequate protection to
surrounding areas. Sugarcane economy states, including Louisiana, also
need to impose harsher liabilities on sugarcane farmers so that farmers take
greater care to follow burn procedures precisely. Since the Louisiana Right
to Farm Act only holds sugarcane farmers liable if plaintiffs can rebut the
presumption of non-negligence,215 farmers are not forced to seriously
evaluate every step of their burns because the chances of them actually
being found responsible for harm are low. If farmers were liable for
trespass due to ash and smoke residue, they would likely take more careful
measures with their prescribed burns and more farmers would voluntarily
follow the Louisiana Smoke Management Guidelines for Sugarcane
Harvesting.
By refusing to adhere to the Guidelines, sugarcane farmers are
essentially acknowledging that there are steps that would limit the harm
their processes cause to surrounding areas, residential properties, and
residents themselves, yet they are unwilling to take the extra time
necessary to fully protect their neighbors. Trespasses may still occur even
with careful evaluation of burning conditions, but these trespasses will be
considerably less if wind speeds, wind directions, and surrounding areas
are consistently considered before burning is commenced.
Louisiana lawmakers and agricultural experts may be concerned that
stricter guidelines for sugarcane burning would deter farmers from
engaging in the industry. Being the second largest producer of sugarcane,
215. LA. REV. STAT. § 3:17(E) (2014).
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Louisiana’s economy relies heavily on the crop.216 This concern is without
merit. Other states where sugarcane is a staple crop do have mandatory
smoke and ash mitigation guidelines that sugarcane farmers are required
to follow,217 and these states still produce a high volume of sugarcane each
year.218 The Louisiana Smoke Management Guidelines should be modeled
after the other sugarcane states in the country, and Louisiana regulators
should follow the lead in making the mitigation guidelines mandatory and
enforceable.
2. Reformation of the Right to Farm Act
Along with the transformation and reformation of trespass laws, the
Louisiana Right to Farm Act219 must be changed in order to revoke the
immunity granted to sugarcane farmers. Since negligence is not a
sufficient remedy for plaintiffs affected by sugarcane residue, holding
farmers liable under a theory of negligence alone is unfair. The Act can be
reformed in a few ways. Ideally, the Right to Farm Act should allow
plaintiffs to bring claims against sugarcane farmers under the theories of
negligence, trespass, or nuisance, depending on which theory best fits the
harm they have suffered. This rework of the Act is more necessary if the
Louisiana Smoke Management Guidelines remain voluntary for farmers,
rather than become mandatory.
Alternatively, if the Guidelines are made mandatory, the Right to Farm
Act could remain in its current state. Negligence would be an acceptable
and successful claim because the farmers would have a standard of care
that they are required to follow. As long as the Smoke Management
Guidelines are voluntary, the standard of care necessary for a negligence
claim is arbitrary and rebuttable. Therefore, unless the Guidelines become
mandatory, the partial immunity granted to sugarcane farmers under the
Right to Farm Act must be repealed, and the Act must allow for other areas
of recovery for plaintiffs.

216. Fletcher, supra note 40, at 2.
217. Florida, Texas, and Hawaii are all major producers of sugarcane. Each
state has a set of guidelines that works to mitigate smoke and ash production and
spread, and farmers’ compliance with these guidelines are mandatory and
enforced in each of these three states. Id. at 23–24.
218. Florida harvests an average of 433,000 acres of sugarcane annually, while
Texas harvests approximately 42,000 acres of sugarcane a year. In comparison,
Louisiana harvests around 358,000 acres of sugarcane annually. Id. at 23–24.
219. LA. REV. STAT. § 3:17(E) (2019).
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CONCLUSION
Unless and until a newer and better method evolves, sugarcane
burning will continue to be an essential part of the industry; however, the
processes causes problems for neighboring property owners as the ash and
smoke from the burning sugarcane trash drift in the wind and invade their
lands. Louisiana currently protects sugarcane farmers from liability unless
they are proven to be negligent in their burning techniques, but this
stringent standard deprives plaintiff landowners of relief when their
property is intruded upon by the byproduct of the burning. Courts are split
on the issue of allowing particulate matter invasions as a claim under the
theory of trespass, so plaintiffs are often limited to bringing claims of
nuisance.
Smoke and ash are vastly different from the light, sound, and
vibrations that make up other nuisance claims. The residue from sugarcane
burning is easily sensed and measured and often settles on neighboring
property, interfering with a person’s possessory interest. Sugarcane
farmers must be required to take better precautions in protecting their
neighbors. While Louisiana has imposed some guidelines for farmers,
smoke regulations in the state are voluntary, and farmers often opt out
based on ease and prior experience with burning. Until these regulations
become mandatory or farmers are held liable for damages done to
neighbors based solely on the result of their burnings, problems with
smoke, ash, and particulate matter trespass will arise time and again.
Courts, at least within each particular state, need to uniformly decide
particulate matter trespass claims, rather than ambiguously relying on
each’s own definition of intangible material. Further, both Louisiana
courts and the Louisiana legislature should work to ensure that sugarcane
farmers are taking all possible steps to reduce smoke and ash residue, in
order to provide greater protection to residents living around the fields that
bring so much sweetness to the state.

342638-LSU_EL_8-2_Text.indd 150

5/21/20 8:22 AM

